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Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on Walter Benjamin's
Theory of Language
Abstract
Walter Benjamin's writings do not owe their intelligibility to their indebtedness to one or more specific
brands of philosophical thought, but to Benjamin's primary concern with the most elementary distinctions
of philosophy itself. Chief among these distinctions is that of philosophical thought itself, or the
difference it makes with respect to the realms of nature, myth, or the appearances. By focusing on the
notions of "communicability" and "translatability," philosophical difference, for Benjamin, shall be shown to
rest on structures within the language of man and art that aim at breaking through language's mythical
interconnectedness, its weblike quality, its textuality, toward the absolute Other of divine language. Yet,
the fundamental philosophical law not to mix genres or realms, as well as the transcending power of
philosophical difference, because it remains caught in what it seeks to transgress, are dependent, as far
as their success is concerned, on the ultimate justification by the (theological) difference of the absolute
Other of divine language. It is, however, not in the power of philosophy to secure all by itself this
necessary legitimation.
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SATURNINE VISION AND THE QUESTION
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REFLECTIONS ON WALTER BENJAMIN'S
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The history of the criticism to which Benjamin's writings have
given rise, is the story of many friendships. Whether he has been
linked up with Hegelian thought, coupled to the theology of the Jewish
religion of revelation, tied to Romantic linguistic philosophy, paired
off with historical materialism, or even related to Lutheran theology,
the critics have primarily sought to appropriate Benjamin's thought
for their own philosophical viewpoint.' Yet Benjamin, as is well
known, did not fraternize easily. As reserved as he was, how could he
have held all those views, or been all those things that critics have
suggested? Undoubtedly, Benjamin's philosophical allegiances that
critics have pointed out have significantly contributed to our understanding of this complex author. If Benjamin, as Gershom Scholem
has insisted time and again, was indeed a philosopher-a
metaphysician-it ought to be possible, in principle, to assign a
definite place to his writings in the history of philosophical thought.'
But can Scholem's characterization of Benjamin as a philosopher
(and hence the possibility of assigning his affiliation) simply be taken
for granted? How is one, indeed, to explain the lack in Benjamin's
writing of almost everything usually associated with the philosophical
enterprise: a homogenous conceptuality, canonized rules of argumentation, and reference to the traditional set of problems? Bernd Witte,
on this basis, has convincingly argued that Benjamin is no philosopher
at all.' The total disregard in Benjamin for any form of sustained conceptuality and argumentation, as well as the elitist, esoterical, if not
idiosyncratic nature of at least Benjamin's early writings-an aspect
that Witte is so far the only one to have systematically explored-runs
69
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counter to the philosophical requirement of transparency and
systematic exposition of arguments. In addition, what Witte calls
Benjamin's authoritarian and hypertrophic subjectivism irreducibly
resists the claim to universality to which philosophy must measure up.
From this perspective it is ultimately impossible to tie Benjamin to
any of the philosophical currents that characterized his time. And yet
he had, undoubtedly, something at stake with philosophy. Until the
debacle regarding his habilitation dissertation, Benjamin even flirted
with the idea of becoming a university teacher of philosophy.
Moreover, most of his work up to that point is obviously of
philosophical inspiration. In view of this paradoxical situation, rather
than choosing between Scholem's or Witte's position on Benjamin,
should one not first explore Benjamin's relation to philosophy in
general? Instead of trying to discover one more philosophical
indebtedness that would link this author up with an established brand
of philosophical thought, it might be appropriate to begin by inquiring
into the importance that Benjamin gave to philosophy as well as in the
modalities of such valorization. To do so I will consider some of the
writings by Benjamin that are commonly referred to as his
metaphysical and historico-philosophical work; in short, writings of
that period in his life that stretches from 1915 to 1926. Since during
those years Benjamin's thought is still in a process of maturing, it is
difficult to approach this period as a whole. Nevertheless, many
motifs of a philosophical bearing characterize his writings at that time,
offering clear testimony to sustained and persistent philosophical concerns. Benjamin himself suggests such a continuity of views and interests when he claims, in a letter to Scholem, that the "EpistemoCritical Prologue" of The Origin of German Ragic Drama not only
replaces his earlier essay "On Language as Such and the Language of
Man," but expresses its original intentions perhaps more effectively.'
Before analysing some of these persistent motifs in greater detail.
let me emphasize that, notwithstanding Benjamin's often obscure and
idiosyncratic writing, the essays and larger works of the period in
question also reveal considerable philosophical refinement. Such
subtlety, however, does not consist in technical refinement; rather it
touches not only on philosophically elementary distinctions, but
above all, on the difference that philosophical distinction makes in the
first place. It is my contention that when Benjamin broaches questions of philosophy, this concern with the difference philosophy makes
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol11/iss1/5
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what occupies him primarily. "Fate and Character," is a case in
point. In this essay, in which the author is primarily concerned with
establishing a total divergence of both concepts-"Where there is
character there will, with certainty, not be fate, and in the area of fate
character will not be found"-Benjamin shows himself fully aware of
the philosophical implication of such an operation.' Fate, he explains,
is a connection (Zusammenhang); more precisely it is "a nexus of
meaning" in which the natural life in man is indiscriminately "coupled
to cards as to planets" so as to weave a net of embroiling threads
(Verkettung) in which the possibility of difference is entirely
liquidated (Reflections, pp. 305, 308). Such non-difference in
weblike interconnectedness "corresponds to the natural condition of
the living," or, in other words, to "the demonic stage of human existence" we are told (Reflections, pp. 307, 308). Webs of whatever
sort, because they make difference impossible, are mythical in
essence. In the essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities, Benjamin notes
that without difference, all of existence succumbs to the power of nature and its concept which, free of boundaries, expands monstrously.
Without a sovereign principle or limits, "the life of myth
sets itself
up as the sole power in the realm of being."6Where character is understood to be, as is commonly the case, "a network that can be tightened
by knowledge at will into a dense fabric" made up of "finer and closer
connections until what looked like a net is tightened into cloth," it can
then become, as Benjamin remarks, erroneously connected to fate
(Reflections, p. 309). To make character a function of an embroilment of threads in a weft, is to endow it with the same mythical
indifference that already distinguishes fate. Character, for Benjamin,
can be clearly demarcated from fate only if it is defined not by the immense complexity of a tightly woven cloth, but, on the contrary, by an
exclusive character trait through which the knots of fate are cut apart.
If distinguished by "the brilliance of its single traits," character stands
in radical opposition to the interconnectedness and embroilment of
fate, causing it to be (in all its forms) "liberating" (Reflections,
p. 311). The importance that Benjamin attributes throughout his
writings to the tragic hero is based on a similar principle. By proudly
recognizing that he is better than the gods with whom he has been
chained up, this hero instigates a myth-shaking difference by which he
rises from out of what is termed "the mist of guilt," or in other words,
from out of the realm of mythical and natural interconnectedness.
Through this eye-opening insight into man's distinction from the gods,
is

.
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a difference is made by which boundaries are assigned to myth and
nature. Benjamin can, therefore, consider the tragic hero as the
prototype of the philosopher who dispels natural and mythical indifference in an act of setting himself apart by raising his head higher.
Distinction and difference are rooted in an act of demarcation by

which the interlacings of myth are shattered in the name of a radical
heterogeneity-truth. In his essay on Goethe, Benjamin writes:
"Genuine art and genuine philosophy-in counterdistinction from
their nongenuine and theurgical stage-begin in Greece with the end
of myth, because both rest, one not less, the other not more, on truth"
(GS, I.1, 162).
I would like to show in what follows that the concept of difference-of a difference that breaks up the continuum of the mythical
chain-is a persistent concern of Benjamin's thought. But in analysing
this philosophical motif par excellence-and, it is indeed, through difference that philosophy comes into the world-I shall also be able to
reflect on the limits of philosophy from the perspective of truth that
Benjamin adopts. From the start, let me emphasize that the act
through which the tragic hero raises his head above the mythical
interconnectedness of guilt is not simply a purely mental act of
abstraction. The difference that he inaugurates, the limits he draws,
are not the result of pure cognition, meditation, or contemplation, but
of a hubristic reflection that culminates in self-confident recognition
that he is better than his gods. The difference that the tragic hero
brings into the world is rooted in an act of revolt; it is a very practical
act of cognition. Instead of proceeding through philosophical abstraction or reduction, the tragic hero achieves difference by destroying the
interwoven threads of the mythical web, or, by violently breaking up
the mythical web of the realm of mere appearance. Difference, in
short, is based on an act as concrete as a revolt, a violent exhaustion
(Azdiehrung) or burning up, by what Benjamin will later call "The
Destructive Character." This difference is thus not simply
philosophical. As the tragic hero's hubristic act shows, it is artistic
and religious as well.
In order to bring Benjamin's treatment of philosophical difference more clearly into view, I will briefly consider the essays "On
Language as Such and the Language of Man," "The Task of the
Translator," as well as some aspects of the "Epistemo-Critical
Prologue." From the start it is necessary to emphasize that
Benjamin's elaborations in the essay on "Language as such" do not
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fall in any of the traditional philosophical modes of discussing this

issue. This is of capital importance considering that throughout the
period of Benjamin's writing that we are concerned with here, the pilot
science for the coming philosophy he envisioned was to be a theory of
language. All his developments of language have a double thrust.
They intend to dismantle both an instrumentalist understanding of
language-what he calls the bourgeois theory of language-and a
theory of language that takes the word to be the essence of the thing, or
in short, what he calls mystical linguistic theory (Reflections, pp. 318,
324). Roughly speaking, Benjamin distinguishes his own investigation of the nature of language from the two views on language as
discussed in Plato's Cratylos, that is, against the two theories on language that have informed all philosophies of language hitherto. Critics
such as Winfried Menninghaus have argued that by dismissing as insignificant language's utilitarian function, and by inquiring into the
non-signifying nature of language, Benjamin became a structuralist
before its time.' Richard Wolin, by contrast, contends that Benjamin's
criticism of the receptive and cognitive aspects of language is a result
of a "long-standing Kabbalistic doctrine of language as the divine
substance of reality."' As I shall argue, Benjamin's theory of language is based neither on insight into the structure of linguistic representation nor on the assumption of a definable divine linguistic
substance. Benjamin leaves those alternatives behind.
All language, Benjamin insists, communicates primarily a mental meaning (geistige lnha he). But, language does not communicate
such mental content by way of serving as an agency for it. Rather, this
content is communicated in unmediated fashion in, and not through
the medium of language. Although this content is communicated in
language, it does not coincide with the linguistic medium in which it is
expressed. It is something quite different from that medium. Benjamin
notes that "the distinction between a mental entity and the linguistic
entity in which it communicates is the first stage of any linguistic
theory" (Reflections, p. 315). What, then, is the specific object that
language communicates? Benjamin writes: "As communication, language communicates a mental entity, i.e.. something communicable
per se leine Mitteilbarkeit schlechthinl" (Reflections, p. 320). The
mental content distinct from the linguistic entity in which it is communicated is thus communicability itself. In itself, that is, as an
expressive medium, language communicates communicability. It is
the primary content of language, and for Benjamin, the true and sole
Published by New Prairie Press
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object of a philosophical theory of language. Yet apart from a very
brief reference by Derrida to the issue of communicability in
Benjamin, not one of the leading Benjamin critics has bothered to shed
some light on this rather intriguing notion.9 Without its clarification,
however, Benjamin's theory of language remains necessarily obscure.
The same must be said of Benjamin's concept of translatability which
informs his entire theory of translation. It has not to my knowledge
drawn any attention by Benjamin scholars.
One might, at first, be tempted to understand communicability as
simply the (condition of) possibility of communication. Since
Benjamin also notes, however, that "languages have
no speaker,"
and that communicability is communicated, not through but in language, communicability is obviously not a Kantian formal condition
of possibility (Reflections, p. 316). Its characteristics are not subjective. Thus, if communicability is at all to be related to the traditional
concepts of possibility, it is rather of the order of a real possibility
(dunamis) of potency in language. As we will see hereafter, it is
indeed an objective characteristic of language as language. But rather
than speculating on the status of communicability, let us return to the
text of "On Language as Such" to clarify this concept's meaning.
After having established that the mental being which communicates itself in language is not outwardly identical with the linguistic
being in which it is expressed, Benjamin remarks: "Mental I geistige
Wesen I is identical with linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of
communication I mitteilbarl. What is communicable in a mental entity
is its linguistic entity." The communicable, consequently, is that part
of a spiritual being that is linguistic, that part that is expressed in
unmediated fashion in the spiritual being's communication. What this
means is that what is being communicated is primarily its language
itself, language (Sprache) being understood here in a strictly verbal
sense as relating exclusively to language as act. The communicable
per se is, thus, language's language, or communicability. This is the
spiritual content kat'exokhen in language. When Benjamin writes:
"The answer to the question ' What does language communicate?' is
therefore 'All language communicates itself,' " he does not contradict his earlier statement regarding the difference between language as linguistic being and the content expressed in it qua linguistic
medium. Itself, indeed, designates a "substance" different from the
specific language in which the communication occurs. This substance
is language's communication itself, the very act and fact that it speaks.
.
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Beyond the Cratylic alternatives of understanding the word as either a
means to designate things different from it, or as expressing immediately the essence of things themselves, communicability refers to
the speech act in the word. This communicability, language's act of
communication in a verbal sense, is for Benjamin the fundamental
problem of all philosophy of language. It is the communicable per
se.
What I have said up to this point about communicability as the
object par excellence of the theory of language may seem simply
trivial. Upon further scrutiny, however, this impression may dissolve
and the triviality of communicability may reveal itself as similar to
those essential simplicities with which philosophy is concerned.
Although communicability has the looks of a philosophical condition
of possibility, it designates only language's communication itself.
Why. then, does Benjamin still cast language's communication of
itself in terms of possibility'? At the beginning of the essay "On Language as Such" Benjamin contends, in order to insinuate at the outset
that communicability is not simply a philosophical category. "that we
cannot imagine anything that does not communicate its mental nature in its expression" ( Reflections, p. 314). A linguistic theory for
which communicability is the object par excellence, has indeed, as he
claims, an "intimate connection with the philosophy of religion"
(Reflections, p. 320). Communicability, understood as language's
communication of itself as communicating, is, in things. "the residue
of the creative word of God" ( Reflections, p. 331), and thus oriented
by the horizon of this divine source. Rather than a category of
possibility, communicability is constituted by things' yearning to
relate to the origin of their creation in the Word. In language. in a verbal sense of their expression, things communicate that they are of divine origin. It shows them in a process of wanting to communicate, to
be heard, and redeemed. This then is the point where one can grasp the
specificity of communicability. It marks the difference it makes to be
able to speak-a difference that shows everything created to have its
truth in the divine Word. But such yearning, such intention in Ian
gunge, is not subjective. Not things yearn to be heard: only that part of
them that is spiritual, already linguistic-the residue of the creative
word-does so. Communicability is. thus, an objective metaphysical) category that designates the difference that expression or
language makes to the extent that as expression and language it communicates all by itself its difference. Yet language makes such a
(
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difference only by marking itself off against something else. Communicability, consequently, implies a motion of breaking away from.
of separation. It represents a tendency or intention only to the extent
that it is a part of a flow that leads away from a given condition. This
condition is that of the world of appearances (Schein). For Benjamin.
language is characterized in depth by a tendency of pointing away
from that realm, thus making a difference.
In order to understand better this difference-producing function
of communicability and hence the status of this category itself, I turn
to "The Task of the Translator." From the start, let me emphasize that
the law of translation which Benjamin formulates in this essay is as
objective a law as the one that we have seen determine language's
expressive function.
In the same way as communicability indicates a yearning of language to be heard as expressing communication itself, independently
of all symbolic and utilitarian functions of language, in the same way
translatability, as an objective category of the work of art, points
beyond the original itself. Rather than aspiring at a fulfillment of the
original, translatability indicates the work of art's search for a fulfillment in something other than the original itself. Translatability, as a
call in the work of art, calls for a liberation of the work of art from
itself. Benjamin remarks: "No translation, however good it may be,
can have any significance as regards the original."" On the contrary,
a translation implies a displacement, even a disregard of the original's
sense, as we shall see. The objective possibility of translation, a
possibility that is also a call for it, can thus best be described as an
inner limit of the work of art: or in short, as a structural feature that,
within the work itself, points beyond it. Translatability is the means by
which the work of art rises above itself, above its own linguistic
enmeshments. It is an operator of sorts, of difference, and not what
one could commonly call an essence.
According to Benjamin, the language of works of art differs from
that of ordinary language to the extent that it is no longer simply
referential and intentional. As Benjamin's strong criticism of intentionality reveals, intentions for him belong to the world of appearances and phenomena." They are a function of natural and subjective ends by which words become chained up with things external. In
this sense ordinary language is thoroughly natural language since it is
governed by mythical interconnectedness. While artistic language
breaks with these natural and, thus, mythical properties of language.
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of art has not for that matter already transgressed all of language's mythical interconnections. Its language is still characterized
by a certain natural relation between its content and itself, a relation
that Benjamin describes as forming "a certain unity in the original,
like fruit and skin" (Illuminations, p. 75). A poet's effort, Benjamin
reminds us, is directed "solely and immediately at specific linguistic
contextual aspects 'sprach fiche Gehaltszusammenhange 1." Therefore. the work of literature and poetry finds itself still "in the center of
the language forest linnerer Bergwald der Sprache I" (Illuminations,
p. 76). As similar images in The Origin (or the Goethe essay) reveal.
where Benjamin refers to the "wooded interior" of the symbol-a
reference probably to Baudelaire's poem "Correspondances"-the
image of the language forest serves to stress the literary works'
symbolic aspect, which is to say, its being constituted by a natural
unity based on natural relations between sign and content ( Origin.
p. 165). Now, translatability represents in the work of art the objective call for overcoming this still natural unity rooted in mythical
linguistic relations. Translatability is, in the work of art, the yearning
to break the mist of the symbolic relations that constitute it as a
mythical web-or, a text for short. Translations, if they are to be
successful, must indeed, achieve this goal. As Benjamin's stress on
literal, or verbatim translation clearly shows, a translation that
measures up against a work of art's demand for translation does not
only disregard content and sense, it destroys the original's structures
of reference and sense communication as well. Whereas the language
of the original destroys language's state of being hooked up to
empirical intentions, a translation destroys the art work's natural
linguistic unity "with root and branch !mit Stumpf and Stiell"
(Illuminations, p. 75). It "faces the wooded ridge of language from
the outside" (Illuminations, p. 76), Benjamin remarks. Because the
language of translation undoes language's functions and structures for
imparting sense, and with this all natural linguistic relations, the language of translation stands in a relation of disjunction (Gebrochenheit) to its content (Illuminations, p. 75). It is characterized by broken
natural or symbolic relations, or to refer to another of Benjamin's
images, by a relation of discrepancy. Indeed: "While content and language form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit and its skin, the
language of translation envelops its content like a royal robe with its
ample folds. For it signifies a more exalted language than its own and
thus remains unsuited to its content, overpowering and alien." Like
the work
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the royal robe, language in translation represents nothing but the
power of language, language in actu, independently of all content it
may impart and of the structures that make such communication

possible.

Translatability is, in the work of art, that structure that points
away from its still natural linguistic unity and weblike quality, toward
language itself. It is. within the artwork's language, the structure
directed beyond its own symbolic language and its entanglements. "at
language as such, at its totality," "Intention auf die Sprache als
solche," says the German text, intention being understood this time in
a radically nonsubjective and nonempirical fashion." This structure,
immanent to the language of the original, calls for a departure from
that language toward pure language-language beyond its utilitarian
and symbolic functions, beyond the burden of extra-linguistic
meaning and the structures upon which it rests: which is to say, toward
the difference that language as language makes. Thanks to this structure the work of art raises itself above textual. weblike, and hence
mythical interconnectedness to communicate that within it, language
speaks, or that within it, a difference has been set forth.
Because of its direction (Richtung), a translation is not called
upon by the original work of art for the sake of that work itself, but
rather for the benefit of pure, or divine language itself. The difference
that translatability makes is a difference determined by this objective
intention toward what Benjamin calls the "afterlife" of the works of
art, or in short, toward what is thoroughly on the other side of natural
life and its connections.
Yet what does this nonphenomenal and pure state of language, at
which art's demand for translation aims, represent? And what is its
relation, finally, to the original itself? Translation, Benjamin writes,
"ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central reciprocal
relationship between languages" (Illuminations, p. 72). He continues: "Languages are not strangers to one another, but are, a priori
and apart from all historical relationships, interrelated in what they
want to express." But languages are not akin to one another as far as
their words, sentences and linguistic structures are concerned, nor are
they related through the content that individually they impart:
Rather, all suprahistorical kinship of languages rests on the intentions underlying each language as a whole-an intention,
however, which no simple language can attain by itself but which
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is realized by the totality of their intentions supplementing each
other: pure language. While all individual elements of foreign
languages-words, sentences, structure-are mutually exclusive, these languages supplement one another in their intentions.
(Illuminations, p. 74)

What Benjamin establishes here as "a basic law of a philosophy of
language," namely, that all singular languages intend one and the
same thing (eines und :war dasselbe), had already been thematized in
the earlier essay "On Language as Such" under the name of communicability. The latter stipulated that language, qua language, qua
linguistic medium, communicates only the unmediated communication of its own communicating. And in the same way as this mediumrelated quality presupposes a distancing from language's instrumental functions, language's intention toward pure language likewise
becomes manifest only if languages become thoroughly denaturalized. Such denaturalization of natural language-the task par excellence of translation-is achieved by translation's focusing not on a
language's intended objects, but on the mode of its intending, or on
what the Scholastics called modus significandi-the mode, or intention, of meaning (Art des Meinens)."
By finding in his own language those tendencies or intentions
toward pure language that transcend its own natural condition, the
translator produces "in it the echo of the original" (Illuminations,
p. 73). In this, his enterprise resembles the Adamic naming language
as described in "On Language as Such." As Benjamin establishes in
this essay, man can name things only because they communicate their
expression, their linguistic being to him. What they express is their
communicability, their each-time-singular intention to communicate: "Their language passes into man" when man contemplates
(Anschauen) things and names the singularity of their expression
(Reflections, p. 329). A name is the proper name, so to speak, of
things' intention, or mode of signification. In other words, in thus
calling by their name the each-time-singular mode in which things
yearn to speak, man completes language as communication in actu,
by naming it. The name names language's each-time-particular mode
of communicating. its mode of expression. Hence Benjamin can state
that the name "is the innermost nature of language itself. Naming is
that by which nothing beyond it is communicated, and in which language itself communicates itself absolutely. In naming, the mental
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entity that communicates itself is language. Where mental being in its
communication is language itself in its absolute wholeness, only there
is the name, and only the name is there"( Reflections, p. 318). He can
conclude, therefore, that "one can call name the language of language (if the genitive refers to the relationship not of a means but of a
medium )"( Reflections, p. 319). It is of interest to note that Benjamin,
in "On Language as Such," also calls man's naming languagewhich is both receptive and spontaneous-translation; it is
"sprachempfangend" to the extent that it listens to "the language of
things themselves." and independent to the extent that in naming it
names itself as language (Reflections, p. 325). In short, in translation
as in naming, the intent to communicate as well as its each-timespecific mode of meaning is named, and thus raised to an autonomy of
its own.
The "Translator" essay reproduces this same movement of language, a movement that names that which language yearns to communicate, and which does so in setting itself off from all of language's
natural and mythical qualities. A translation, I have said, focuses on
what in the original is of the order of intention toward the divine, and
difference-creating Word (independent of the content intended), and,
more precisely, on the overall mode of its language as language. In its
own language it establishes a correspondence to the mode in which the
original speaks by activating that which in its language breaks with the
latter's natural condition. A translation, therefore, can be said to be
"directed at language as such." In philosophical terms, a translation
seems to be based on what the Scholastics called intentio secunda
(formalis). Rather than focusing on the object intended in the initial
intention, translation-but naming as well-cognitively reflects on
the ens rationis that is the primary act of intending itself (actus
intellectus reflectus, id est quo aliquid per reflexionem cognoscimus). Indeed, in naming the singular modes in which things
express themselves, things become known to man: "Only through the
linguistic being of things can he gain knowledge of them from within
himself-in name" (Reflections. p. 319). By translating, in the
original, the intention toward pure language. this intention is also
reflected upon and made known. In naming as well as in translation,
communicability and translatability-or the structures within language that yearn for a liberation from its natural and mythical
interconnectedness and weblike quality-are cognitively appropriated. The name as well as a translation reflect on difference, on the
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difference which in language itself permits language to overcome its
own mythical entanglements.
The reference above to the philosophical issue of intentio secunda is not a reference to one particular philosophical problem. Rather,
it is a reference to philosophy itself. Philosophy constitutes itself in
the act of a distancing reflection as a rational entity, different from the
immediate, from being, etc., and as concerned with exploring and
assessing its own difference in the attempt to secure its autonomy in
self-foundation. Naming and translating, because they reflect cognitively on difference, are of the order of philosophy. Benjamin himself
makes the connection, at least as far as translation is concerned. The
"divination and description" of pure, or divine language is, he writes,
"the only perfection a philosopher can hope for." Yet such pure language, the language of truth, "is concealed in concentrated fashion
in translation." Translations are therefore not only intrinsically
philosophical, but "there is (even) a philosophical genius characterized by a yearning for that language which manifests itself in
translation" (Illuminations, p. 77).
But such cognitive reflection of difference as it occurs in the
Adamic act of naming, in translation, and in the task of the
philosopher, has its intrinsic limits. Indeed, it does not, for Benjamin,
escape all mythical predicament. Let me first remark that a translation is in principle unable to "possibly reveal or establish" the pure
language intended by the nonnatural tendencies of artistic language
(Illuminations, p. 72). Although the translator's task is spurned by
"the great motif of integrating many tongues into one true language,"
his intention remains "ideational," that is, regulated by this idea in a
Kantian sense (Illuminations, p. 77). All a translation can hope for is
to "represent it in embryonic or intensive form Idarstellen, indem sie
es keimhaft oder intensiv verwirklichtj." The mode of representation
in question. a mode "of so singular a nature that it is rarely met within
the sphere of nonlinguistic life"-a mode, by the way, that originates
in chemistry-allows only for an "intensive-that is, anticipative,
intimating-realization" of the hidden relationship between the languages (Illuminations. p. 72). What is true of translation, that it "is
only a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages," since "an instantaneous and final rather than a
temporary and provisional solution of this foreignness remains out of
the reach of mankind," is valid for Adamic naming language, and for
philosophy as well (Illuminations, p. 75). Although man, in "On
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Language as Such," is shown to be "the speaker of language" since
"he speaks in name," this only "vouches for the fact that language as
such is the mental being of man," and not, for the one realizing language as such in naming, the divine word (Reflections, pp. 318-19).
Adam's naming language, which answers things' language, is,
notwithstanding its importance, only one moment of "the uninterrupted flow of
communication [that' runs through the whole
of nature from the lowest forms of existence to man and from man to
God" (Reflections, p. 331). Philosophy too, and its thought of difference, is only one rung on the ladder that leads to what Benjamin
terms doctrine (Lehre), which is concerned with the Divine, or pure
difference itself. "
As Benjamin knew very well, the translation by name of the difference that things communicate to man in their expression, as well as
a translation's articulation of what in the original's language hints at
the hidden kinship of languages, establishes a community between
two spheres that needs an ultimate grounding in a higher sphere.
However perfect the language may be into which the less perfect language is translated, "the objectivity of this translation" must be
"guaranteed by God," he reminds us (Reflections, p. 325). Indeed, as
Benjamin argues in "On Language as Such," it is only because the divine word created things, which thus contain as a residue "the germ of
the cognizing name," that man can name things in the first place
(Reflections, p. 325). Benjamin demonstrates a fine philosophical
sensitivity when he declares that the task by man of naming things
"would be insoluble were not the name-language of man and the
nameless one of things related in God and released from the same
creative word, which in things became the communication of matter in
magic communion, and in man the language of knowledge and name
in blissful mind" (Reflections, p. 326). For naming and translation to
be possible, a prior "identity of the creative word and the cognizing
name in God" must, indeed, be assumed. The identity of the creative
and at once cognizing divine word-this ultimate community-is the
condition of possibility of all expression and all naming, or translation.
In his "Program of the Coming Philosophy," where Benjamin
takes in the name of a unitarian approach to the question of the
ultimate ground, a critical stand against the Kantian division
between epistemology and metaphysics, or in short, between criticism
and dogmatic philosophy, he already severely criticized the
.

.
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Kantian philosophical notions of experience and cognition. Yet, the
metaphysics aimed at in this essay still envisioned the possibility of a
higher form of specifically philosophical cognition and experience in
which the "absolute, as existence," God for short, could be encountered in unmediated fashion." Although such concepts of experience
and cognition already turn philosophy into the doctrine of religion
with its immediate absolute certainty of the absolute, Benjamin continued to think the latter as cognitively apprehensible in systematic
unity. But by the time of his later work, The Origin, Benjamin had
given up the hope that mere thought could think and conceptually
come to grips with the fundamental identity and unity of the ultimate
ground. In the Goethe essay, Benjamin already established that the
unity of philosophy, its system, is in no way within the reach of
philosophical questioning ( GS, 1.1,172-73). Truth, he states in "The
Epistemo-Critical Prologue," "is devoid of all intention, and certainly does not itself appear as intention. Truth does not enter into
relationships, particularly intentional ones." Its mode of existence is
that of "an intentionless state of being." The prior identity that, as
seen, must underlie both poles of a translation process, can no longer
be approached philosophically since, as he writes, "truth is the death
of intention" ( Origin, pp. 35-36). All attempts to come to grips with it
cognitively, by attempting to ensnare truth in the "spider's web" of
thought "as if it were something which came flying in from outside,"
show philosophy still to be in the grips of myth ( Origin, p. 28). Cognition is still intentional and relational, and thus mediated by natural
desires and ends. Benjamin writes: "Knowledge is possession. Its
very object is determined by the fact that it must be taken possession
of-even if in a transcendental sense-in the consciousness"( Origin,
p. 29). Knowledge, because it is reflective, is still a function of natural
subjectivity. The systems it weaves, and in which everything becomes
linked to the subject, are mythic webs that allow for no difference.
The Adamic naming gesture, the task of the translator and of the
philosopher as well, are thus limited to being moments in a higher
scheme because naming, translating or reflecting difference presupposes an underlying prior unity which they themselves cannot
hope to bring about. But it is not so much because of their status of
being moments that all three orders are limited; it is, rather, the fact
that they are still cognitive, and hence fundamentally incapable of
truly setting difference free.
Truth, or the prior identity, not only escapes the reach of
Published by New Prairie Press

15

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 5

84

STCL, Vol. 11, No.

I

(Fall, 1986)

cognitive appropriation, it also does not relate intentionally to what it
embraces, itself included. It does not relate to itself in a relational
manner, since all such relation would, according to Benjamin, still be
mythical. For the same reason, truth is not of the order of intentio
recta, the intention of intention, nor for that matter, the language of
language. The reflexivity characteristic of intentio recta only distinguishes man's naming language, as well as the status of translation
and philosophy, each of which are mere moments in the flow of communication of difference that runs through all of creation toward
God.
Although naming, translating, and philosophizing are constituted by the telos of the creative word and the hidden kinship of languages, they cannot by themselves bring that unity about, or cognize
it. In spite of the fact that communicability and translatability point
away from the mythic web of language toward the difference of nonphenomenal "Otherness," the philosophical activity of naming and
reflecting these difference-producing tendencies remains caught up in
what it yearns to transgress. In other words, the structures of
transcending immanent to language, the structures that create difference by pointing away from language's empirical and mythical entanglement such as translatability and communicability, are unable to
achieve the pure difference that they aim at and presuppose. However
decisive the transcending power of the linguistically immanent structures of difference may be, they remain finite. They are not different
enough, not as radically different as an absolute ground, by right,
ought to be. Their transcending and difference-creating power, as well
as the objectivity of these structures, are themselves in want of an ultimate justification and legitimation by the absolute Otherness of truth.
But they cannot hope to bring this sanctioning about on their own
terms. It is a legitimation that only truth itself can, in its own time and
on its own terms, grant. And since truth is not relational, intentional.
or based on reflection, such granting cannot, for Benjamin, be of the
order of the modes of grounding available to philosophy, such as
legitimation or justification. Since Benjamin conceives of truth as
radically different, and in total disjunction from that of which it might
be the truth, such demand for grounding by the structures of difference that are communicability and translatability can only take
place through their radical Erlosung, or release from the prisonhouse
of language.
Communicability and translatability, as seen, come closest to
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being philosophical concepts of difference. But this proximity is also
that which for Benjamin constitutes their limit. They are still
epistemological concepts of difference, and in want of a redeeming
relation to truth which thought is unable to provide. The difference
from the embroilments and enmeshments of nature and myth they
achieve, however decisive it may be, is not yet radical. The difference-producing thrust of these structures depends, as to their
possibility and effect, on a difference so radical that it escapes the
spider web of thought. Philosophical difference, for Benjamin, is thus
a function of a difference that escapes its grasp, but a difference that it
must nonetheless presuppose, even though by itself it is unable to
secure this difference's legitimizing function. Because of these limits
of philosophy, to truly disrupt the threads that make up the tightly
woven web of myth by establishing a difference that would escape
the empirical and the subjective, and that would be fully objective (or
rather, because of philosophy's limitations in immanently and
singularly securing the transcending thrust of the difference which
philosophical difference makes with respect to and at the level of
myth, the empirical, and the aesthetic), philosophy itself must call for
legitimation by a higher instance, namely, by the doctrine of truth. Yet
it is not in the power of philosophy to secure for itself an answer to its
pledge.
Whether this inability of the philosophical concepts of difference to secure their own legitimation truly implies an irreducible
relation of philosophy in general to theological concepts, as Benjamin
seems to suggest, or whether such a problematic is not rather a function of a lack of an ability on Benjamin's part, to sound the intellectual
possibilities of philosophy, along with a perhaps too-narrow Kantian
concept of philosophy as criticism, are questions I cannot hope to
solve here. What, by contrast, I can try to show is that the flaws of the
philosophical concepts of difference are not, for Benjamin, simply
shortcomings. Indeed, their finite nature contains paradoxically, not
the promise, but the possibility of a chance that they might truly strike
a difference. To show that this is the case, I shall return once again to
the internal limits of the structures of difference that I discussed.
It is not in the power of these structures, however objective they
might already be, to break away once and for all from the empirical
and aesthetic web of language toward divine language. All they
achieve is a caesura in the realm of mythical entanglement. A
caesura, Benjamin tells us, does not lead to a complete separation of
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what it divides; as an instance of critical power a caesura only
prevents the parts and levels in question from becoming mixed (GS,
1.1, 181-82). A caesura keeps them simultaneously together and

separate. Benjamin illustrates such caesura! difference when
discussing the relation of a translation to the sense of the original, with
the following simile: "Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly
1,17Uchtigil and at but one point, with this touch rather than with the
point setting the law according to which it is to continue on its straight
path to infinity, a translation touches the original lightly and only at
the infinitely small point of sense, thereupon pursuing its own course
according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux"
(Illuminations, p. 80). In order for a translation to correspond to the
demand for translation in the original, it must disregard, or rather.
touch the original's sense in such a manner that a movement away
from sense is inaugurated. The disregard of sense must not be absolute; such difference in translation would be abstract, false, erring difference. True philosophical difference is achieved in the fleeting touch
of what is to be disregarded, in fidelity to what is to be abandoned.
A caesura thus seems to yield to the philosophical demand par
excellence-that genres as different as the universal and the particular, the empirical and the transcendental are not to be mixed-of
which Benjamin has shown himself fully aware in his criticism of
Friedrich Schlegel's attempt to conceive of the unity of art (first,
thought as an idea in the Platonic sense as proteron to physei) as itself
a concrete work of art (GS, 1.1, 90). But the difference between that
philosophical law itself and Benjamin's use of it is rather striking. For
Benjamin, the universal or transcendental is not, as seen, a given or
something that could be thought in its unity, and that could thus be
clearly marked off against the empirical or the particular. Benjamin's
concept of difference is based on the assumption that the radically differing pole of philosophical difference or opposition is not at hand. In
lack of the radical and non-phenomenal Other, all that thought can do
is touch on what is in order to move away from it. In this motion alone,
in a differing in an active sense, can the Other, truth or originary difference be anticipated. Benjaminian difference, as it is formulated in
such concepts as communicability and translatability, is thus a difference that realizes in perhaps a fundamental way the philosophical
demand not to mix genres. By fleetingly touching in a disrupting
movement away the webs of language that allow for no difference,
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difference is produced in the first place, and with it, the empty space of
the Other of myth. Although the difference thus created does not
imply clearly divided realms (nor a constituted Other), it anticipates
the possibility of the radical Otherness of truth whose thinking does
not fall into the powers of man.
In short, the difference with respect to the interlacings of language in the grips of myth and nature, which Benjamin seeks to conceptualize, is a difference not between already constituted poles or
realms. Still, the philosophical requirement not to mix remains a
must, or better, becomes even more pressing since in the mythical
absence of difference the demand not to mix turns into the more fundamental demand for difference in the first place. Benjamin's concept of
difference inscribes in itself the impossibility to immanently distinguish between the profane webs of language and its total Other; but the
demand for difference becomes, then, all the more urgent. In the
absence of the total Other-"Other" to a point that it must necessarily
be absent from the mythical webs of language if it is to truly make a difference-of an Other so beyond man's finitude and his natural condition that it can only be termed the sacred, the fleeting touch that
touches to break away is the sole means to instigate difference. This
finite difference, however, points at the radical difference that alone
can make it meaningful, and that alone can grant significance to the
fundamental philosophical law not to mix.
As mentioned, from a philosophical viewpoint, communicability and translatability are finite concepts of transcending and
difference. As such they might seem to mix the incommensurable
dimensions of the universal and the particular. But that is not so since
Benjamin's notion of language-and not unlike Kant's notion of the
sublime which only negatively represents the realm of the ideasrefers to that same realm by violently destroying language's aesthetic
and structural characteristics. In this manner, communicability and
translatability precisely avoid mixing domains. In the same way that
reference in aesthetic considerations to theological concepts does not
only imply no metabasis eis alto genos, as Benjamin remarks in The
Origin, but serves instead to demarcate levels in the first place so that
the theoretical paradoxes which distinguish these considerations can
be solved, the finite concepts of difference, rather than implying an
illegitimate confusion of levels of thought, secure their distinction by
likewise representing (darstellen), that which pertains to "the higher
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domain of theology," in the very destruction of the networks of language (Origin, p. 216). Such destruction, as said, makes the difference.
This concept of difference, then, is not simply a philosophical
concept. Benjamin agrees with Kant that reference to the absolute
ground as absolutely Other is inevitable. He also agrees with this
same philosopher that such a ground cannot in its difference from
objects of nature, be known. Thought cannot hope to conceptualize it,
or realize it in consciousness. Yet Benjamin refuses, not only in
"Program of the Coming Philosophy," but throughout his writings, to
go along with Kant's injunction to keep criticism and metaphysics
separate. For Benjamin to conflate both realms is not to indulge in
empiricism, or what amounts to the same, in the leveling daemonic
forces of myth; on the contrary, such conflation serves only to realize
difference in the first place. Benjamin proceeds from the assumption
that actual reference by (critical) philosophy to the higher domain of
the ground is that which endows philosophy with its distinguishing
trait. Although it cannot think the ground, it actually anticipates it in
the existent. In that sense critical philosophy is for him always already
theology, but not theology, of course, in a positive sense. Benjamin's
concept of difference is not only not a pure philosophical concept
inasmuch as it implies actual reference to "the higher domain of
theology"; neither is it a purely theological concept since what has
been established regarding philosophy as a cognitive undertaking is
valid of theology as a positive discipline as well.
Benjamin's thought of difference cannot be cast in terms of any
particular philosophy, and can thus not be appropriated for any
particular brand of thought. The paradoxical nature of his intellectual
enterprise, permitting multiple appropriations, may well stem fiom,
on the one hand, his seemingly unconditional acceptance of the
Kantian concept of philosophy while refusing at the same time to yield
to the Kantian requirement of distinguishing the critical and the
dogmatic without, on the other hand, opting for a Hegelian solution of
that difference (and in this sense Benjamin is also very much like
Kierkegaard). But Benjamin seems to be specifically concerned with
the fundamental question of how philosophy in general is to make a
difference. Reference in philosophy to the "higher domain of
theology" seems, for Benjamin, to make such difference possible. But
at the same time, this constitutive reference to the absolute Other of
myth and the entanglements of language is also what strikes, with
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irreducible finitude, philosophy's attempt to raise itself above the web
of language. Or rather. it causes such attempt to become utterly
idiosyncratic.
For such a position as the one outlined, a position based on a tension between philosophy and theology, there is, it seems to me, a name
in Benjamin's writings. In The Origin it is called "saturnine vision"
(p. 179). Such vision, or theoretical glance, realizes reference to the
Absolute, to that which is completely separated from the
embroilments of myth and the mythical interconnectedness of language, not through cognitive abstraction, but in "close touch" with
what is, namely, by violently tearing its texture to shreds. This vision's transcending glance reaches only beyond the realm of interconnectedness to the extent that it stands under the sign of the natural
powers and their mythical embroilments that it seeks to overcome.
Saturn is the sign under which Benjamin was born." The daemonic
powers that it symbolizes are such that they limit any order of existence to and within the plane of the profane and temporal. Yet, the
infinitely small crack or the almost insignificant disruption that such
vision under the sign of the most earthy planets produces in the tightly
woven web of the daemonic forces of fate is, because it is (as opposed
to merely phenomenal and cognitive nondifference), anticipatory of
the being of the ideas-or to use another of Benjamin's expressions, of
the "indivisible unity." or, rather, as the German original puts it, "the
crackless (sprunglose) unity of truth" (Origin. p. 33).
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